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Death Is Unconstitutional: How Capital Punishment 
Became Illegal in America—A Future History 
DR. JUR. ERIC ENGLE* 
INTRODUCTION 
We have no choice.  Try as we might, we must breathe so long as we 
live.  The motive force which causes humans to breathe is sometimes 
called the soul.1  The constitution, as Thomas Hobbes says,2 is the “soul” 
of the immortal being,3 comprised of mortals,4 the body politic, the state.  
A constitution, by definition, constitutes the state.  Humans are rational 
social animals and thus the most perfect animals5 who, whether by custom 
  
 * For Annika Veldre, a wonderful psychologist, from whom I learned that deviant behavior occurs 
because people are simply trying to obtain their basic and natural human needs—in dysfunctional ways.  
Those might be the only ways they know due to their experiences or are the only ways they are capable 
of due to the features of their nervous system.  People with mental problems often do not realize they 
had any other choice and therefore might feel justified in their actions.  Psychotherapy helps people 
understand their needs and their unhealthy behaviours in order to transform them as much as possible.  
She also gave me this great quote: “Many that live deserve death.  And some die that deserve 
life.  Can you give it to them?  Then be not too eager to deal out death in the name of justice, fearing 
for your own safety.  Even the wise cannot see all ends.”  J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS, at 
bk. 4, ch. 1.  And also to our lady of the harbor: Best loved by they who know her least. 
 1. This can be seen in the Sanskrit Ātman (soul, breath); c.f. German Atem (breath, though Seele, 
soul).  In Estonian it is also clear: hinge means both “breath” and “soul.”  A puzzle for linguists: how 
did the Uralic and Indic languages have two different words yet the same concept?  (N.b.: There is no 
liquid “g” as in “passage” in Estonian, though the ng diphthong does exist, thus HING-guh—soul). 
 2. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 23 (Oskar Piest ed., 1958) (“For by art is created that great 
LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE—in Latin CIVITAS—which is but an artificial man, 
though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defense it was in-
tended; and in which, the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body . . 
. .”). 
 3. Id. at 142–43 (“This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH, in 
Latin, CIVITAS.  This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN (or rather, to speak more reverently, of 
that mortal god) to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defense.”). 
 4. KARL MARX, THE POVERTY OF PHILOSOPHY 119 (H. Quelch trans., 1920) (“There is a continual 
movement of growth in the productive forces, of destruction in social relations, of formation in ideas; 
there is nothing immutable but the abstraction of the movement—mors immortalis.”). 
 5. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 7 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Kessinger Pub. n.d.) (“Now, that man is more 
of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident.  Nature, as we often say, 
makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. . . . 
[I]t is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the 
like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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(Aristotle),6 or by convention (Hobbes),7 live and work together in states to 
achieve not only the common needs of life,8 but also the anticipated goal of 
a good life.9  The state (society) is as inevitable as breathing. 
A constitution is an organic fact of every state: it is a part of the being 
of the state.  People, like the state, also have a constitution—a character.  
Just as people change over time, so do states.  But just as there are natural 
limits on what people can or cannot become, so there are natural limits on 
what the state can and cannot fairly do.  No man, nor any group of men, ex 
ante may justly take the life of another person, though perhaps their killing 
may be excused (or forgiven) ex post. 
The death of Death would surely be seen by Aristotle, Hobbes, and 
Marx as worthy of contemplation.10  The death of the state and its replace-
ment by society was the essence of Marx’s work.11   
A condemnation to life means the prisoner is condemned to breathe, to 
contemplate their error and to try the impossible: repairing the injury they 
caused.  Some people under that circumstance would prefer to die.  Some 
fates are worse than death.  We are a social animal, and killing is the most 
asocial act. 
There are two aspects to any entity: the being and the becoming.  The 
death penalty is becoming unconstitutional out there, in the real world.  It 
may take another ten years, or only three, or even twenty.  In my inner 
world, and in all of Europe, Canada, Australia, and South Africa, state kill-
ing of prisoners has already been rejected for some time.  At some point, 
the rising principle—the becoming—will replace the falling principle—the 
being—and the death penalty will be seen by all courts to be a violation of 
the law of the land in the United States.  How will that happen? 
  
 6. “Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to 
some good.”  Id. at 5.  “[W]hen several families are united, and the association aims at something more 
than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the village.  And the most natural form 
of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family . . . .”  Id. at 6 (emphasis added).  “When 
several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-
sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in exis-
tence for the sake of a good life.”  Id. at 6–7. 
 7. See generally HOBBES, supra note 2, at 139–42.  I do not believe that there ever was a state of 
nature.  I take Aristotle’s view that the state (society) is natural and inevitable, and not conventional 
because individuals are not self sufficient.  The social contract and the state of nature are impossible.  
The right to rebel against tyrannical oppression and exploitation is an inalienable natural right, not an 
alienable convention. 
 8. ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 6–7. 
 9. Id. 
 10. “Death, thou shalt die!”  John Donne, Death Be Not Proud (Holy Sonnet X), reprinted in 
BARTLETT’S POEMS FOR OCCASIONS 219 (Geoffrey O’Brien ed., 2004). 
 11. “Marx’s and Engels’s views on the state and its withering away were completely identical . . . .” 
VLADIMIR LENIN, THE STATE AND REVOLUTION, at ch. 5, § 1 (1918), reprinted in 25 LENIN 
COLLECTED WORKS 381, http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/staterev/ch05.htm. 
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Conceptually, it is clear. The death penalty is unconstitutional because 
it is irrational.  The punishment is disproportionally and unfairly meted 
out, and it is irrevocable.  The wrong people sometimes get killed12 and a 
disproportionate number of the killed are descendants of slaves.13  More-
over, capital punishment does not deter criminal behavior14 and is costly 
and inefficient.15 Capital punishment within the prison plantation system is 
simply one more injustice inflicted on black people by white people.  Ra-
cism kills. 
Capital punishment is also per se unconstitutional as a violation of nat-
ural rights and of international law.  To expose this argument we must first 
show that natural law and international law are part of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. 
I.  THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 
The United States are heirs to a constitutional tradition that can be 
traced back to Magna Carta and to the Roman ius commune and Saxon 
customary law. The customary constitution (i.e. the unwritten common 
law) which the United States inherited from England traces its roots to the 
Roman ius commune, to Cicero and Aristotle, and is the basis of the writ-
ten constitution.  The unwritten U.S. Constitution protects the rights of all 
persons, particularly the weak, and defends justice.  Its principles are dis-
covered by natural reason and it is the embodiment of natural justice.  We 
can find rights in the U.S. Constitution directly from the British Constitu-
tion and indirectly from the constitutions of other nations.  We discover 
those rights using natural reasoning. 
  
 12. See, e.g., Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Did One Man Die for Another Man’s Crime?: ‘I 
Didn’t Do It but I Know Who Did,’ CHI. TRIB., Jun. 25, 2006, at C20; see also Equal Justice USA, 
Larry Griffin, http://www.ejusa.org/grip/reasonabledoubt/Larry%20Griffin.html. 
 13. See infra Statistical Annex Table 1. 
 14. Capital punishment cannot deter crimes of passion or crimes committed by the stupid.  See 
generally Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal Reasoning on Capital 
Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 255 (2006); Robert Weisberg, Death Penalty Meets Social 
Science: Deterrence and Jury Behavior Under New Scrutiny (Stanford Law Sch. Annual Review of 
Law & Soc. Sci., Working Paper No. 114, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=752044. 
 15. Jeffrey A. Fagan, Capital Punishment: Deterrent Effects & Capital Costs, COLUM. L. SCH. REP., 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/law_school/communications/reports/summer06/capitalpunish (“[E]ach 
execution can cost between $2.5 million to $5 million.”). 
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A. The English Foundation of the U.S. Constitution 
The U.S. Constitution is a direct successor to the structure and sub-
stance of the British Constitution.  Accordingly, to understand the U.S. 
Constitution, sometimes misleadingly called a “written constitution,” we 
must understand the British Constitution, sometimes misleadingly called 
an “unwritten constitution.” 
1. Sources and Structure of the British Constitution 
The British—and thus the Colonial—Constitution contained both writ-
ten and unwritten sources.16  Among the unwritten sources were natural 
law and customary law.17  Customary law was of two sorts: local customs 
of non-constitutional character, and the common law which is, absent leg-
islation, constitutive.  Coke divided the law into three parts:18 written lex 
(statutes), unwritten local custom,19 and common law.20  Customary law 
arises out of common usages (i.e., practices), coupled with the sense that 
such customary actions are obligatory.21  Usage (i.e., habitual common 
practice) is an interpretive guide to our understanding of law.22 
The common law evolved, in part, out of the Roman ius commune23 
and the customs of the Angles and Saxons.  The source and extent of the 
authority of the written constitutional provisions—Magna Carta, the Eng-
lish Bill of Rights, and the Habeas Corpus Act—are found in the unwritten 
constitutive natural law sources of common law. 
  
 16. Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (1987) 
(footnotes & citations omitted) (“Neither a single written document nor a category of either natural or 
enacted law, the ancient constitution was an amorphous admixture of various sources of law.  It was 
essentially custom mediated by reason. . . . This natural law tradition was also echoed in the thought of 
various continental influences on the Americans.”). 
 17. Id. 
 18. 2 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 344a (Phila-
delphia, Robert H. Small 1853) (“‘Law temporall.’  Which consists of three parts, viz.  First, on the 
common law, expressed in our bookes of law, and judicial records.  Secondly, on statutes contained in 
acts and records of parliament.  And thirdly, on customes grounded upon reason, and used time out of 
minde.”). 
 19. 1 id. at 110b (“[I]n special cases, a custome may be alleged within a hamlet, a towne, a 
burgh, a city, a manor, an honor, an hundred, and a county; but a custome cannot be alleged 
generally within the kingdom of England; for that is the common law.”). 
 20. Id. (“Consuetudo is one of the main triangles of the laws of England; those laws being divided 
into common law, statute law, and custome.”). 
 21. Id. (“Of every custome there be two essentiall parts, time and usage; time out of minde, (as shall 
be said hereafter) and continuall and peaceable usage without lawful interruption.”). 
 22. Id. at 81b (“[U]sage is a good interpreter of laws, so non usage where there is no example is a 
great intendment that the law will not bear it . . . .”). 
 23. See R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the Ius Commune, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 297 (1999) 
(comparing Magna Carta with the then contemporary ius commune and suggests ius commune influ-
enced the formulation of Magna Carta). 
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a. Natural Law: Cicero’s “Right Reasoning in Accord with the Law of 
Nature” (recta ratio naturae congruens) 
According to Coke, law is the summation of reason,24 and the realiza-
tion and perfection of rational action.25  Cicero agrees:26 the life of the law 
has been reason.27  However, the reasoning of the common law is a special 
kind: it is a practical reasoning (phronesis) acquired through years of dili-
gent study.28  Reason is the motive force of the rule of law, and one must 
understand the rationale behind the rule of law to appreciate and apply that 
rule correctly.29  This is what is meant by natural law reasoning. 
b. Magna Carta 
Magna Carta is the written cornerstone of the British Constitution.  
That “Great Charter” is, however, an embodiment of natural and customary 
constitutional law, and superior to ordinary laws: “[G]eneral law shall not 
take away any part of Magna Charta.”30  Yet, Magna Carta evolves with 
time,31 protecting an ever-growing sphere of liberties that now encompass 
the internationally recognized right to life. 
The unwritten British Constitution was already quite specific about the 
content of rights by the time of the U.S. Revolution.  The most basic rights 
  
 24. 1 COKE, supra note 18, at 62a (“Lex est summa ratio.”). 
 25. Id. at 97b (“And the law, that is the perfection of reason, cannot suffer anything that is inconven-
ient.”). 
 26. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE REPUBLICA (51 B.C.), reprinted in 3 C.J. DE VOGEL, GREEK 
PHILOSOPHY: A COLLECTION OF TEXTS WITH NOTES AND EXPLANATIONS 177 (3d ed. 1973) (“Est 
quidem vera lex, recta ratio, naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quae vocet ad 
officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat, quae tamen neque probos frustra jubet aut vetat, nec 
improbos jubendo aut vetando movet.”  (True law is right reason in accord with nature.)). 
 27. 1 COKE, supra note 18, at 97b (“[F]or reason is the life of the law, nay the common law itself is 
nothing else but reason . . . gotten by long study, observation, and experience, and not of every man’s 
natural reason; for, Nemo nascitur artifex.  This legal reason est summa ratio.”). 
 28. 2 id. at 183b (“[T]hough a man can tell the law, yet if he know not the reason thereof, he shall 
soone forget his superficial knowledge.  But when he findeth the right reason of the law, and so 
bringeth it to his natural reason, that he comprehendeth it as his own, this will not only serve him for 
the understanding of that particular case, but of many others: for cognitio legis est copulata et compli-
cata; and this knowledge will long remaine with him.”). 
 29. Id. at 395a (“Ratio est anima legis; for then are we said to know the law, when we apprehend the 
reason of the law; that is, when we bring the reason of the law so to our owne reason, that wee perfectly 
understand it as our owne; and then, and never before, we have such an excellent and inseparable 
propertie and ownership therein, as wee can neither lose it, nor any man take it from use, and will direct 
us (the learning of the law is so chained together) in many other cases.  But if by your studie and indus-
trie you make not the reason of the law your owne, it is not possible for you long to retaine it in your 
memorie.”). 
 30. Bernard H. Siegan, Protecting Economic Liberties, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 43, 67 (2003) (quoting 
Dominus Rex v. Tooley, (1613) 80 Eng. Rep. 1055, 1059 (K.B.)). 
 31. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 189 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“What Magna 
Carta has become is very different indeed from the immediate objects of the barons at Runnymede.”). 
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protected by the British Constitution were life, liberty, and property,32 as 
well as the rights to due process of law33 and trial by a jury of one’s peers. 
Trial by jury is a common law34 constitutional right also found in Magna 
Carta.35  These three basic rights are protected through the guaranty of the 
due process of law, which is also rooted in Magna Carta.36  The Great 
Charter guaranties both substantive37 and procedural38 due process of law.  
However, “the ‘Magna Charta, doth not give the privileges therein men-
tioned, nor doth our Charters, but must be considered as only declaratory 
of our rights, and in affirmance of them.’”39  Magna Carta is the embodi-
ment of transcendent principles of natural law. 
Other protections guaranteed by Magna Carta at the time of the Ameri-
can Revolution include the right to life, liberty,40 and property; the prohibi-
tion of ex post facto laws; substantive and procedural due process of law; 
and equal protection under the law of the land, both as to individuals and 
collectivities.41 As specific instances of these general concepts, Magna 
Carta guaranteed, inter alia, that: (1) no one shall be judge of their own 
cause;42 (2) regulations must be a rational means to a permissible end;43 (3) 
executive powers are to be narrowly construed to serve only their intended 
goal which must be in the public interest;44 (4) laws contrary to natural 
right or natural reason, or impossible of performance are void;45 (5) prop-
erty rights are not absolute;46 (6) taxation must be proportional to benefit 
  
 32. Siegan, supra note 30, at 58. 
 33. Id. 
 34. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948) (“This nation’s accepted practice of guaranteeing a public 
trial to an accused has its roots in our English common law heritage.”). 
 35. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“This constitu-
tional concern, itself harkening back to the Magna Carta, arises out of the basic unfairness of depriving 
citizens of life, liberty, or property, through the application, not of law and legal processes, but of 
arbitrary coercion.”) 
 36. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521–26 (1884) (interpreting due process in light of the 
language and interpretations given to parts of the Magna Carta). 
 37. Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941, 972.  
 38. Id. at 971–72.  In discussing chapter 39 of Magna Carta, he [Blackstone] sometimes identifies 
“law of the land” with judicial procedures.  Id. 
 39. Sherry, supra note 16, at 1132 (quoting SILAS DOWNER, A DISCOURSE AT THE DEDICATION OF 
THE TREE OF LIBERTY (1768)). 
 40. Liberty includes the free movement of persons.  “The right to travel is a part of the ‘liberty’ of 
which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth (and Fourteenth 
Amendments).  In Anglo-Saxon law that right was emerging at least as early as the Magna Carta.”  Bell 
v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 293 n.10 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 41. Siegan, supra note 30, at 58–59. 
 42. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B.). 
 43. Id. 
 44. The Case of the King’s Prerogative in Saltpetre, (1606) 77 Eng. Rep. 1294, 1295 (K.B.). 
 45. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652. 
 46. See Mouse’s Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 1341 (K.B.). 
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received;47 (7) that economic competition would be free and fair: monop-
oly is repugnant to the common law.48 
These rights are the unbreakable ribs of the ship of state.  The rebel-
lious colonists fought not to destroy them but to preserve them. 
Blackstone regarded the rights of “personal security, of personal lib-
erty, and of private property”49 as absolute.  Like Coke, Blackstone recog-
nized the unwritten constitution, and contrasted national common law with 
local customs.  Local customs, unlike the common law, were not constitu-
tional.50 
c. Parliamentary Supremacy, or Judicial Review? 
“Magna Charta is such a fellow that he will have no sovereign.” 
– Sir Edward Coke 
 
British constitutionalism “rested on three distinct premises: first, that 
some form of higher law—the British Constitution—existed and operated 
to make void acts of Parliament inconsistent with that fundamental law; 
second, that this fundamental law, or constitution, consisted of a mixture of 
custom, natural law, religious law, enacted law, and reason; and third, that 
judges might use that fundamental law to pronounce void inconsistent leg-
islative or royal enactments.”51  Against this view is the idea of an absolute 
parliamentary sovereignty.  The usual reading is that parliamentary su-
premacy precludes judicial review.  That reading is erroneous.  Judicial 
review is possible in that the law must be moral and reasonable; that is, law 
to be valid must comport with the principles of natural justice.  The usual 
reading is also erroneous in that it sees parliamentary supremacy as su-
premacy vis-à-vis the law.  In fact, parliamentary supremacy refers to the 
relation of Parliament to the King.  Parliament, under the British Constitu-
tion, while supreme as to the King, was, and is, subject to natural law.52  
Acts of Parliament that are “against common right and reason, or repug-
nant, or impossible to be performed” are void.53  This is of course seen in 
the U.S. Supreme Court “rational review” jurisprudence: legislation that is 
  
 47. The Case of the Isle of Ely, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 1139, 1142 (K.B.). 
 48. The Case of Monopolies, (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1265–66 (K.B.). 
 49. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 140 (Univ. of Chi. Press 
1979) (1765). 
 50. Id. at 74–75. 
 51. Sherry, supra note 16, at 1128–29. 
 52. City of London v. Wood, (1701) 12 Mod. Rep. 669, 678 (K.B.) (“[A]n act of parliament can do 
no wrong[.]”).  That is, an immoral law is not a law.  Id. 
 53. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B.). 
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irrational is void.54 The better view of parliamentary supremacy was eluci-
dated by Coke.  According to Coke, only the House of Lords can overturn 
the common law;55 that is, the common law had (and has) a special consti-
tutional status that set it apart from local customs.  Judicial review, with 
the House of Lords as ultimate arbiter, is part of the British Constitution.56 
Blackstone noted that the House of Lords played exactly the same role 
which the U.S. Supreme Court today plays as ultimate arbiter of the Con-
stitution.57  And indeed judicial review exists in Britain in the proceedings 
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC). 
Britain ultimately rejected the idea of judicial review of the constitu-
tionality of legislation against the common law particularly as positivism 
became seen, wrongly, as somehow inconsistent with natural law.  How-
ever, parliamentary supremacy did not become a settled issue in English 
constitutional law until one hundred years after the U.S. Revolution.58  At 
the time of independence, Coke’s view on judicial review was the majority 
view, particularly in the colonies.  Rather than breaking from Coke, as is 
commonly believed, I argue that Blackstone refined Coke’s views on the 
relations of the British executive (the Crown), legislature (Parliament), and 
judiciary (the House of Lords, particularly, later, the JCPC).59  In all events 
the unwritten British Constitution in 1776 is the starting point of the U.S. 




 54.  1 COKE, supra note 18, at 140a (“[O]ne of the maxims of the common law, viz. that all customs 
and presumptions that be against reason are void.”). 
 55. Id. at 115b (“The common law has no controller in any part of it, but the high court of parlia-
ment; and if it be not abrogated or altered by parliament, it remains still, as Littleton here saith.  The 
common law appeareth in the statute of Magna Charta and other statutes (which for the most part are 
affirmations of the common law) in the originall writs, in judiciall records, and in our bookes of termes 
and yeares.”). 
 56. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652. 
 57. See Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 28 F. Cas. 1012 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 
16,857).  
 58. Glenn M. Willard, Courts of General Jurisdiction: Judicial Power Extending to Cases Arising 
Under the “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God,” 7 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 22 (1996) (“The Bonham’s 
Case principle was affirmed, though carefully circumscribed, only fifty-three years before Blackstone 
wrote his Commentaries. . . . [T]he principle was not categorically denied until 1871 . . . .”).  
 59. Id. at 23 (“[I]n Blackstone’s eighth edition of his Commentaries, published in 1778, there is a 
note in the margin of a copy, alleged to be in Blackstone’s own hand, that makes the latter part of the 
second sentence of the quotation above read: ‘I know of no power in the ordinary forms of the Consti-
tution that is vested with authority to control it.’  The ninth and all later editions have this modification.  
Josiah Quincy suggested that Blackstone had changed his opinion with respect to judicial review, as a 
consequence of American precedents.”). 
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B. America: The U.S. Constitution Is a Successor to the British Constitu-
tion 
The U.S. Constitution is a successor to the British Constitution.60  The 
American Revolution was fought to secure the rights of the Colonists, as 
English subjects to the rights of Englishmen: life, liberty, and ownership of 
property (“the pursuit of happiness”).61  Sources of U.S. constitutional law 
are either written or unwritten, and are either binding or persuasive.  Writ-
ten binding sources include the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the English 
Bill of Rights, Magna Carta, and the Habeas Corpus Act.  Unwritten bind-
ing sources include natural law reasoning and international law.  Written 
persuasive evidence includes the Declaration of Independence and the 
writings of Coke, Blackstone, Locke, and The Federalist Papers.  Unwrit-
ten persuasive evidence includes legal maxims. 
The original intent of the framers of the Constitution was to include 
within the Constitution numerous unwritten62 sources of constitutional law 
which were part of the British Constitution.63  Consequently, the U.S. Con-
stitution is a successor to the British Constitution,64 and the English civil 
  
 60. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935) (No. 339) (“We did 
not create a new Constitution as a result of the Revolution.  All the pre-Declaration of Independence 
conventions and resolutions show, whether from small groups or from such sources as the Boston 
Convention and the Continental Congress, the demand of the Colonies was not for a new Government 
or for a new Constitution.  The complaint was that King George and his Parliament were violating our 
Constitution which had come down to us through the centuries as our heritage from our ancestors.  We 
fought not to free ourselves from a Constitution, but to preserve it.  Ours was not a true revolution.  It 
was a territorial secession and a resort to arms to preserve our existing Constitution.  When we wrote 
our Constitution we naturally brought forward in the main our former unwritten Constitution.  On this 
point an analytical comparison of the unwritten and the written Constitutions, the facts of our history 
and the weight of probabilities agree.”). 
 61. Benjamin Franklin argued from the “‘common rights of Englishmen,’ as declared by Magna 
Charta, and the petition of right.”  4 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, The Examination of Doctor Benjamin 
Franklin, in the British House of Commons, Releative to the Repeal of the American Stamp Act (1766), 
in THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 412, 445 (Albert Henry Smyth ed., 1906). 
 62. Thomas C. Grey, Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment: The Uses of an Unwritten 
Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211, 217 (1988) (“[T]he American Revolution was made by a 
generation of lawyers and pamphleteers who believed in and were used to arguing on the basis of a 
legally supreme and yet unwritten English or British constitution.”). 
 63. Jed Rubenfeld, The New Unwritten Constitution, 51 DUKE L.J. 289, 289–90 (2001) (“From the 
very beginning, American judges have been prepared to enforce constitutional rights that cannot fairly 
be said to derive from any enumerated textual guarantee.  The Framers themselves, we are told, under-
stood constitutional rights in unwritten, natural-law terms, drawing on the English lex non scripta and 
“ancient constitution” traditions passed down to them by Blackstone and others.”). 
 64. See, e.g., Dollar Sav. Bank v. United States, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 227, 239 (1873) (“The 
rule thus settled respecting the British Crown is equally applicable to this government . . . . It 
may be considered as settled that so much of the royal prerogatives as belonged to the King in 
his capacity of parens patriae, or universal trustee, enters as much into our political state as it 
does into the principles of the British constitution.”) 
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rights as of 1776 applied—Crown be damned—to Americans.65  The 
sources and structure of the U.S. Constitution are essentially the same as 
those of the British Constitution.  The American Colonists retained their 
customary rights under the British Constitution.  An honest originalist in-
terpretation recognizes the natural law component of American constitu-
tionalism; the intention of the framers was that the Constitution must be 
interpreted within the contexts of pre-constitutional writings and natural 
law reasoning. 
1. Binding Sources of U.S. Constitutional Law 
a. Written Binding Sources: Magna Carta, English Bill of Rights 
The U.S. Supreme Court regularly cites British constitutional docu-
ments such as Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights, and the Habeas 
Corpus Act.66  These are written binding sources of U.S. constitutional law. 
i. Magna Carta 
Magna Carta67 is an integral part of the U.S. Constitution.68  The provi-
sions of Magna Carta are reproduced in U.S. written constitutional docu-
ments in translation word-for-word.69  Magna Carta has constitutional 
value in the United States.70  It is a binding source of unwritten constitu-
tional law.  Congress may recognize more liberties than in the Great Char-
ter but not less.  The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that the signification 
of Magna Carta changes over time, admitting an ever greater number of 
  
 65. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 84 (1942) (“Since it was first recognized in Magna Carta, 
trial by jury has been a prized shield against oppression, but, while proclaiming trial by jury as ‘the 
glory of the English law,’ Blackstone was careful to note that it was but a ‘privilege.’  Our Constitution 
transforms that privilege into a right in criminal proceedings in a federal court.” (citation omitted)). 
 66. E.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237 n.10 (1940) (comparing Bill of Rights with the 
Habeas Corpus Act). 
 67. Riggs, supra note 37, at 969 (“Given the common perception of Magna Carta as a protection 
against arbitrary government, it is not surprising that the colonists also resorted to the Great Charter in 
their controversies with king and Parliament, particularly over the right to tax.”). 
 68. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 107 (1908) (naming Bill of Rights and Magna Carta).  
“[T]he great instruments in which we are accustomed to look for the declaration of the fundamental 
rights . . . .”  Id. 
 69. Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn and Elsewhere, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1477, 1511 (2005) (“At the time of the American Revolution, the substantive provi-
sions of the Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights became central to the process of the drafting of 
the state constitutions and, later, the United States Constitution.  The United States Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights incorporated many of the substantive provisions of both documents, sometimes word-for-
word.”) 
   70.    Twining, 211 U.S. at 105 (“Magna Carta, ‘a sacred text, the nearest approach to an irrepealable, 
“fundamental statute” that England has ever had.’”). 
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essential liberties.71  Moreover, the liberties protected by Magna Carta are 
to be accorded even greater protection in the United States than in Eng-
land.72  Magna Carta is cited by U.S. courts, because it is the root of the 
U.S. Constitution.73  For example, the right to property is rooted in Magna 
Carta.74  Likewise, the principle that no person should be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, except by due process of law, originated in Magna 
Carta.75  The principle “Ubi jus ibi remedium”—wherever there is a right, 
there is a remedy—originated in Magna Carta and the common law.76  Due 
process of law is equivalent to the law of the land as used in Magna Carta 
and due process of law as used in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
are coextensive.77  Coke interpreted due process as a general protection 
against governmental oppression.78 
ii. The English Bill of Rights 
Like Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights79 is an organic part of the 
U.S. Constitution.  “There is no doubt that the [English] Declaration of 
Rights [of 1689] is the antecedent of our constitutional text.”80  The Eighth 
Amendment was derived from Magna Carta81 and the English Bill of 
  
 71. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1996) (“[O]wing to the progressive development of 
legal ideas and institutions in England, the words of Magna Charta stood for very different things at the 
time of the separation of the American colonies from what they represented originally.”). 
 72. Id. at 531–32.  “The concessions of Magna Charta were wrung from the King as guaranties 
against the oppressions and usurpations of his prerogative.”  Id. at 531.   
Applied in England only as guards against executive usurpation and tyranny, here they have 
become bulwarks also against arbitrary legislation; but, in that application, as it would be 
incongruous to measure and restrict them by the ancient customary English law, they must 
be held to guarantee not particular forms of procedure, but the very substance of individual 
rights to life, liberty, and property. 
Id. at 532. 
 73. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003); see supra text 
accompanying note 35. 
 74. E.g., Miller v. McKenna, 147 P.2d 531, 536 (Cal. 1944). 
 75. Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 101 (1878); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 123 
(1876). 
 76. See, e.g., Smith v. Mercy Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 560 N.E.2d 1164, 1169 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
 77. Davidson, 96 U.S. at 101 (“The equivalent of the phrase ‘due process of law,’ according to Lord 
Coke, is found in the words ‘law of the land,’ in the Great Charter . . . .”); Wichita Council v. Sec. 
Benefit Ass’n, 28 P.2d 976, 980 (Kan. 1934); Ex parte Sizemore, 8 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1928); see also Den v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. (Murray’s Lessee), 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 
276 (1856); Motor Equip. Co. v. Winters, 69 P.2d 23, 28 (Kan. 1937); Jordan v. Gaines, 8 A.2d 585, 
587 (Me. 1939); State v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731, 769 (N.C. 1949); State v. McClintick, 23 Ohio Misc. 
194, 198 (1970). 
 78. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276. 
 79. See generally An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Succes-
sion of the Crown, 1688, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.). 
 80. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991). 
 81. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284–85 (1983). 
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Rights.82  Likewise, “[t]he bail clause was lifted with slight changes from 
the English Bill of Rights Act.”83  Moreover, “the Eighth Amendment’s 
ban on cruel and unusual punishment embraces, at a minimum, those 
modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at 
the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted.”84 
Like the British Constitution, the U.S. Constitution evolves with time 
to reflect “evolving standards of decency.”85 This is especially relevant to 
capital punishment since the historical trend is very clearly abolition of 
capital punishment as ineffective, expensive, and unjust. 
iii. Foreign Sources 
The U.S. Supreme Court sees civil law concepts of law and justice and 
Magna Carta as consistent because the common law developed in part out 
of the Roman ius commune.86  There is not one law in Athens and another 
in Rome.87  Looking at foreign law to appreciate the U.S. Constitution is 
  
 82. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 266 (1989). (“[I]t is clear that the 
Eighth Amendment was ‘based directly on Art I, § 9, of the Virginia Declaration of Rights,’ which 
‘adopted verbatim the language of the English Bill of Rights.’  Section 10 of the English Bill of Rights 
of 1689, like our Eighth Amendment, states that ‘excessive Bail ought not to be required, nor excessive 
Fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual Punishments inflicted.’” (citations omitted)). 
 83. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952). 
 84. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986). 
 85. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 86. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530–31 (1996) (“The Constitution of the United States was 
ordained, it is true, by descendants of Englishmen, who inherited the traditions of English law and 
history; but it was made for an undefined and expanding future, and for a people gathered and to be 
gathered from many nations and of many tongues.  And while we take just pride in the principles and 
institutions of the common law, we are not to forget that in lands where other systems of jurisprudence 
prevail, the ideas and processes of civil justice are also not unknown.  Due process of law, in spite of 
the absolutism of continental governments, is not alien to that code which survived the Roman Empire 
as the foundation of modern civilization in Europe, and which has given us that fundamental maxim of 
distributive justice—suum cuique tribuere.  There is nothing in Magna Charta, rightly construed as a 
broad charter of public right and law, which ought to exclude the best ideas of all systems and of every 
age; and as it was the characteristic principle of the common law to draw its inspiration from every 
fountain of justice, we are not to assume that the sources of its supply have been exhausted.  On the 
contrary, we should expect that the new and various experiences of our own situation and system will 
mould and shape it into new and not less useful forms.”). 
 87. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, TREATISE ON THE COMMONWEALTH, in 1 THE POLITICAL WORKS OF 
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO (Francis Barham trans., London, Edmund Spettigue 1841–42), available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=546&layout= 
html (“There is a true law, a right reason, conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal, 
whose commands urge us to duty, and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil.  Whether it enjoins or 
forbids, the good respect its injunctions, and the wicked treat them with indifference.  This law cannot 
be contradicted by any other law, and is not liable either to derogation or abrogation.  Neither the 
senate nor the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal law of justice.  It 
needs no other expositor and interpreter than our own conscience.  It is not one thing at Rome and 
another at Athens; one thing to–day and another to–morrow; but in all times and nations this universal 
law must for ever reign, eternal and imperishable.”). 
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perfectly consistent with the natural law foundations of the British Consti-
tution. 
b. Unwritten Binding Sources 
i. Natural and Common Law 
Natural law remained and remains an unwritten source of constitu-
tional law in the new republic: “statutes against law and reason are void.”88  
The unwritten sources of the U.S. Constitution are at least as important as 
the written ones, for “[t]he sacred rights of mankind are not to be rum-
maged for, among old parchments or musty records.  They are written, as 
with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of di-
vinity itself; and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power.”89  
These rights are deathless.  The framers intended courts to look to natural 
law and customary constitutional law when interpreting the Constitution:90  
If these rights were thought to be inherent, what, then, was a 
legislature doing when it “enacted” enumerated and elaborate lists 
of fundamental rights and principles?  It was merely declaring 
rights already in existence: “Magna Charta, doth not give the 
privileges therein mentioned, nor doth our Charters, but must be 
considered as only declaratory of our rights, and in affirmance of 
them.”91 
These unwritten sources of constitutional law were used ab initio in the 
review of the constitutionality of legislation.92  Judicial review was a prac-
tice even of colonial courts.93  The English Constitution of 1776 estab-
lished a minimum standard of U.S. rights.  The written constitution would 
  
 88. Sherry, supra note 16, at 1138 (quoting Alexander Hamilton). 
 89. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, The Farmer Refuted, in 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 81, 
122 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1961). 
 90. Suzanna Sherry, Commentary on the Symposium Interpreting the Ninth Amendment: The Ninth 
Amendment: Righting an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1001, 1003 (1988). 
 91. Sherry, supra note 16, at 1132 (citation omitted). 
 92. Id. at 1143–44 (“Commonwealth v. Caton, a 1782 Virginia case . . . is the first reported case in 
the United States in which a court reviewed a statute for constitutionality.  Caton and others had been 
sentenced to death for treason under a 1776 statute that, in addition to defining the treason, removed the 
pardon power from the executive to the legislature.  The lower house of the legislature (the House of 
Delegates) passed a resolution pardoning the prisoners, but the Senate refused to concur.  When the 
attorney general moved the court for authority to execute the prisoners, Caton and his fellows re-
sponded that the 1776 statute must either be interpreted to grant pardon power to the House of Dele-
gates alone or be held unconstitutional.  The Virginia Court of Appeals, to which the case was sent by 
the trial court because of its novelty and difficulty, found the statute constitutional and held the single-
house attempt at pardon ineffective.”) 
 93. E.g., Robin v. Hardaway, Jeff. 109, 114 (Va. 1772) (citing Coke). 
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explicitly denominate the then implicit and customary rights, would not 
abridge them, and could and did expand them, notably in the case of free-
dom of the press.94  “[T]he Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, 
and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS.”95  Ubi dubium, ibi 
libertas would be the motto of the Republic:96 when in doubt, freedom.97 
ii. International Law 
Customary international law, as Blackstone recognized, 98 is an organic 
part of the common law.99  Magna Carta is not a mere statute of local ap-
plication to England but was valid overseas in the colonies as well.100  U.S. 
courts consider international opinion in their increasing rejection of capital 
punishment101 because customary international law is an integral part of the 
common law102 and because treaties are part of the supreme law of the 
land.103  International consensus opposes capital punishment104 and increas-
ingly limits its application.  The global trend is against death. 
  
 94. Bernard H. Siegan, Protecting Economic Liberties, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 43, 73–74 (2003).  “[A]s 
Alexander Hamilton put it in The Federalist Papers No. 84, the United States Constitution was a bill of 
rights.  It did not grant the national government any power to deprive the people of their common law 
rights.”  Id. at 73. 
 95. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).  
 96. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
 97. JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY 154 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1874) (“Quotiens 
dubia interpretatio libertatis est, secundum libertatem respondendum erit.  Whenever there is a doubt 
between liberty and slavery, the decision must be in favor of liberty.”). 
 98. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at 66, 73 (“International law is ‘deducible by natural reason,’ and 
each state shall ‘aid and enforce the law of nations, as part of the common law; by inflicting an ade-
quate punishment upon offenses against that universal law.’”). 
 99. William C. Bradford, The Changing Laws of War: Do We Need a New Legal Regime After 
September 11?, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1429 n. 248 (2004) (“[T]he English common law 
regarded international law as a species of natural law—and therefore a part of the domestic law—that 
bound all individuals and states consistent with the principle that natural law resided at the apex of the 
hierarchy of sources of law both domestic and international.”). 
 100. Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 403 (1842) (argument of appellant, who won at the 
U.S. Supreme Court). 
 101. People v. Bull, 705 N.E.2d 824, 846–47 (Ill. 1998) (Harrison, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (noting death penalty unconstitutional and considering foreign judicial opinion). 
 102. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that “international law is a part of 
our law”); see also Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Human Rights 
Litigation), 25 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that previous courts did not hold that “interna-
tional law is not part of federal common law if there are no contradictory federal statutes”); Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he law of nations... has always been part of the 
federal common law.”). 
 103. U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution . . . and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state 
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstand-
ing.”). 
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2. Persuasive Sources 
a. Written Persuasive Sources 
i. The Declaration of Independence 
The Declaration of Independence is a constitutional document serving 
as an interpretative guide to the teleology of the American Republic: “[I]t 
is always safe to read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Dec-
laration of Independence.”105  However, the Declaration of Independence, 
apart from an embodiment of the natural constitutional right of rebellion, is 
only a persuasive source—evidence—of the Constitution: the statements of 
the Declaration do not have the force of organic law.106  However, courts 
do sometimes refer to the Declaration to help determine constitutional is-
sues.107 
ii. Works of Learned Scholars 
Persuasive evidence of the content of the U.S. Constitution can also be 
found in Coke’s Institutes, Blackstone’s Commentaries,108 and scholarly 
writings such as the works of John Locke, Adam Smith, and The Federalist 
Papers.109  All these various sources are cited in U.S. courts as sources and 
evidence of the U.S. Constitution.110  For example, the privileges and im-
munities111 clause is derived from due process and equal protection of the 
  
 104. State v. Koskovitch, 776 A.2d 144, 226–27 (N.J. 2001) (Long, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (“The international community has moved more quickly toward an understanding of the 
flaws and dangers inherent in any capital punishment scheme.”). 
 105. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 159–60 (1897).  
 106. Filan v. Martin, 684 P.2d 769, 773 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). 
 107. See, e.g., id.; Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 33 App. D.C. 83 (1909); Peo-
ple ex rel. Tyroler v. Warden of City Prison, 51 N.E. 1006 (N.Y. 1898). 
 108. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904) (“Blackstone’s Commentaries are accepted as 
the most satisfactory exposition of the common law of England. . . . [U[ndoubtedly the framers of the 
Constitution were familiar with it.”).  
 109. Finkelman, supra note 69, at 1500–01. 
 110. E.g., Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 
U.S. 1 (1892); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657 (1838); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 
(1821); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).  In ascertaining the meaning of the phrase “repub-
lican form of government” the debates of the constitutional conventions and The Federalist Papers are 
of great importance, if not conclusive. 
 111. Randolph J. Haines, Getting to Abrogation, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 447, 451 (2001). 
Blackstone had defined the basic rights of Englishmen—those set forth in the Magna Carta, 
the Habeas Corpus Act, the Petition of Right, and the English Bill of Rights—as a collection 
of “privileges” and “immunities,” and explained why he chose each of those terms: “The 
rights themselves, thus defined by these several statutes, consist in a number of private im-
munities; . . . that residuum of natural liberty, which is not required by the laws of society to 
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laws, which are rules of law rooted in Magna Carta.112  Given the current 
trend to overlook the fact that the Constitution was intended by the framers 
to be open-ended and interpreted in the context of time, the constitutional 
importance of Blackstone’s Commentaries cannot be overemphasized.113  
b. Unwritten Persuasive Sources: Maxims of Law and Equity 
Maxims or aphorisms of law are witty sayings designed as memory 
aids and to convey legal meaning quickly and cogently.  Their use has been 
in decline,114 but they are making a comeback.115  Llewellyn argued the 
maxims were contradictory.116  Sunstein is trying to revive them and is not 
alone.117  Maxims are best seen as persuasive evidence of the law.118  They 
are, like axioms of geometry,119 fundamental principles from which other 
legal propositions can be correctly formed.120  At least in death penalty 
litigation, it should be noted that “de morte hominis nulla est cunctatio 
longa.”121  Maxims of law should be seen as persuasive evidence of the law 
only, but may be useful as guides to the substance of the law. 
  
be sacrificed to public convenience; or else those civil privileges, which society hath en-
gaged to provide, in lieu of the natural liberties so given up by individuals.” 
Id. (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at 125–29). 
 112. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 413–14 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 113. ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 11 (1984) (“All of our 
formative documents—the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Federalist Papers, and 
the seminal decisions of the Supreme Court under John Marshall—were drafted by attorneys steeped in 
[Blackstone’s Commentaries].”); David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach 
Access and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1382 (1996); see also Martha J. Dragich, Will 
the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to 
Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 771–72 (1995); 
Mark Spatz, Comment, Shame’s Revival: An Unconstitutional Regression, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 827, 
835 (2002) (“Blackstone’s treatise, Commentaries on the Laws of England, served as the source of law 
for American courts.”). 
 114. J. Stanley McQuade, Ancient Legal Maxims and Modern Human Rights, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 
75, 75 (1996) (“Until the middle of the nineteenth century books were still being published which 
appeared to regard the ancient maxims as central pillars of the law.  The teaching of the law was organ-
ized round them.  They were cited reverentially in court.  Since that time the maxims have steadily 
declined in importance.”). 
 115. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1179, 
1179–81 (1990). 
 116. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 521–35 (4th prtg. 1969) (1960).  
 117. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1990). 
 118. Freeman v. Caldwell, 10 Watts 9, 10 (Pa. 1840). 
 119. BOUVIER, supra note 97, at 116 (“Maxims in law are somewhat like axioms in geometry.”). 
 120. Liebig Mfg. Co. v. Wales, 34 A. 902, 907 (Del. Ch. 1896) (“These principles are legal maxims 
or axioms essential to the existence of regulated society.”); Rice v. State, 7 Ind. 264, 265 (1855) 
(“There are some propositions that may be regarded, we think, at this day, as being settled; as having 
passed into the rank of maxims or axioms in American jurisprudence.”). 
 121. BOUVIER, supra note 97, at 123 (“When the death of a human being may be concerned, no delay 
is long.  When the question is concerning the life or death of a man, no delay is too long to admit of 
inquiring into facts.”). 
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II.  A NATURAL LAW ARGUMENT AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 
The prisoner is as one at war with the state.  Yet in war we ordinarily 
do not execute captured enemy prisoners.  Here we discuss the various 
natural law arguments against the death penalty. 
A. International Law 
Customary international law is an integral part of the common law.122  
Though international law does not yet prohibit capital punishment per se, 
there is a clear abolitionist trend internationally.  The United States is “the 
only western democratic state to employ the death penalty for ordinary 
crimes during times of peace.”123  While U.S. state courts increasingly kill 
prisoners,124 the U.S. Supreme Court is increasingly finding exceptions to 
the application of the death penalty, e.g., in cases of the mentally re-
tarded125 and minors,126 but also in cases involving mandatory sentenc-
ing127 and the crime of rape.128  Happily, the trend is against death. 
However, the United States has repeatedly imposed capital punishment 
in defiance of treaties the United States authored and signed.  For example, 
in 1998 Virginia executed Angel Breard, a Paraguayan convicted of rape 
and murder in state court.129  Paraguay had obtained an order for a stay of 
execution from the International Court of Justice (ICJ).130  Under interna-
tional law, federal governments are responsible for the acts of their feder-
ated states.  The Virginia government ignored the ICJ’s order.131  Similar 
  
 122. See Bradford, supra note 99. 
 123. Kristi Tumminello Prinzo, The United States—“Capital” of the World: An Analysis of Why the 
United States Practices Capital Punishment While the International Trend Is Towards Its Abolition, 24 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 855, 856 (1999) (citing Ursula Bentele, Race and Capital Punishment in the United 
States and South Africa, 19 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 235, 237 (1993)). 
 124. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, FACTS AND FIGURES ON THE DEATH PENALTY 5–6 (Jan. 1, 2007), 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/alfresco_asset/c3d650aa-a2a8-11dc-8d74-6f45f39984e5/act50 
0022007en.pdf. 
 125. E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
 126. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574–75 (2005). 
 127. E.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301–04 (1976). 
 128. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598–600 (1977) (finding the death penalty an uncon-
stitutionally disproportionate sentence for the crime of rape of an adult woman). 
 129. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 372–74 (1998) (per curiam). 
 130. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 258 (Apr. 9). 
 131. In Beard, the Supreme Court indicated that the U.S. secretary of state asked Virginia to stay the 
execution, pending the result of the ICJ case.  The Court found that it was unable to intervene because 
of the Eleventh Amendment.  That view was rather uncreative.  The Eleventh Amendment divests 
jurisdiction from the federal courts over cases in law and equity.  It does not refer to cases before the 
admiralty courts.  The admiralty courts were those which specialized in international law at the time.  
Since the Eleventh Amendment does not divest the federal government of jurisdiction over admiralty 
cases, a foreign plaintiff could bring a claim under international law (as opposed to national law!) 
before the federal courts.  Moreover, as far as international law is concerned, the internal constitution of 
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facts existed in the LaGrand Case.132  There, a German citizen was to be 
executed, also by Virginia.  The defendants in LaGrand had not been in-
formed of their right under the Vienna Convention to obtain the advice of 
their consulate.  The ICJ unanimously issued an order to stay the execu-
tion.133  Once again, Virginia executed the foreign national134 in violation 
of U.S. treaty obligations.  The United States also regularly ignores Mex-
ico’s assertions of its citizens’ rights, having executed more than one 
Mexican national unapprised of his right to consular advice by Mexico.  
Currently the U.S. Supreme Court is slotted to decide another case where a 
state did not apprise a foreign defendant of their rights under a U.S. 
treaty,135 Medellín v. Texas.136 
The issue arises because the Eleventh Amendment divests jurisdiction 
in law and equity by foreign citizens and subjects from federal courts but at 
the same time also divests the states of their unlimited international legal 
personality.  This appears to result in a conflict between international obli-
gations and the domestic constitutional order.  That conflict contradicts the 
very logic of a federal constitution and that fact should tell us something is 
amiss with thinking that the Eleventh Amendment applies here. 
First, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims at admiralty—and 
the admiralty courts were the courts for hearing international law claims at 
the time of independence.  So, in fact, the U.S. government is not divested 
of its sole and exclusive final authority over cases in international law. 
Second, even if these cases were considered as being under law or eq-
uity (as opposed to admiralty, i.e. international law) the Eleventh Amend-
ment applies to lawsuits “by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.”  The Eleventh Amendment does not apply 
to lawsuits by foreign states!  The Eleventh Amendment does not divest 
the judicial power of the United States in cases of law or equity brought by 
foreign states.  The Eleventh Amendment’s terms are expressly limited to 
divesting jurisdiction over suits brought by citizens and subjects of foreign 
states.  Thus, the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to the consular 
cases, for it is the foreign citizens’ states which are asserting their right to 
  
any state is irrelevant to the international obligations of that state.  Additionally, U.S. states ceded their 
treaty making powers to the federal government.  Members of federations have, at most, limited inter-
national legal personality.  For a contemporary view of these purely internal questions of U.S. constitu-
tional structure, see Thomas Healy, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism and the Treaty 
Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1726. 
 132. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27). 
 133. Id. at 515–16. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Hear Appeal of Mexican Death Row Inmate, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 1, 2007, at A16. 
 136. Medellín v. Texas, No. 06-984 (U.S. argued Oct. 10, 2007). 
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apprise their citizens of their consular rights.  The directly injured party in 
these cases is not the individual.  It is their state.  The individual may have 
a derived claim therefrom, but unless their state intervenes on their behalf 
they do not have a remedy under international law because international 
law governs, in principle, only states in their relations inter se and not the 
relations of states to individuals.  Individuals, only exceptionally, have 
directly enforceable rights under international law. 
To reiterate: international law gives its protections principally to for-
eign states and only exceptionally to individuals.  In principle, individuals 
must rely on their state for enforcement of their rights under international 
law.  The Eleventh Amendment does not apply to foreign states.  Rather it 
applies only to citizens and subjects of foreign states.  Thus, the Eleventh 
Amendment does not apply to the consular cases.  When Texas does not 
apprise foreign criminals of their consular rights, the injured party is not 
the foreign citizen, rather it is their state, and the right to a remedy under 
international law is not the individual’s, rather it is their state’s. 
In its 2003 decision in the Avena Case,137 the ICJ ruled that the United 
States breached its obligations under the Vienna Convention to provide for 
consular notice and assistance and to inform the defendants of their right 
thereto.138  Finally, the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol 
to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in 2005 over the issue of 
consular rights of capital defendants.139  U.S. allies are rightfully outraged 
at the lack of respect of their citizens’ rights.  How would the United States 
react were a U.S. citizen to be imprisoned in, say, Mexico, not informed of 
his consular rights, and executed? 
Because the United States ignores international treaties it has signed 
and tortures140 and executes prisoners, foreign states often refuse U.S. ex-
  
 137. Avena & Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). 
 138. Id. at 53–54. 
 139. Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases: Foes of Death Penalty Cite Access to 
Envoys, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at A1 (“The United States proposed the protocol in 1963 and 
ratified it—along with the rest of the Vienna Convention—in 1969.”). 
 140. Ian Austen, Canadian Manual Has U.S. on Torture List, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2008, at A10; 
Canada Puts U.S. on “Torture List,” BBC NEWS, Jan. 18, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ 
world/americas/7195276.stm; U.S. Acknowledges Torture at Guantanamo; in Iraq, Afghanistan—U.N., 
AFX NEWS, June 24, 2005; American Civil Liberties Union, Autopsy Reports Reveal Homicides of 
Detainees in U.S. Custody, http://action.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/102405/ (listing autopsy reports of 
persons tortured to death that were obtained from the Department of Defense under Freedom of Infor-
mation Act requests.) (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).  The U.S. military has admitted that it has tortured 
prisoners.  See, e.g., Torture of Iraqi POWs, http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/torture_pow.html 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2008).  Salon has also documented graphic evidence of U.S. torture of prisoners of 
war.  See Joan Walsh, The Abu Ghraib Files, SALON, Oct. 2003, http://www.salon.com/news/ 
abu_ghraib/2006/03/14/introduction/.  The CIA has admitted to near drowning of intentional prisoners 
(so called waterboarding).  CIA Admits Waterboarding Inmates, BBC NEWS, Feb. 5, 2008, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7229169.stm. 
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tradition requests.  The European Convention on Human Rights can limit 
extradition of suspects who face the death penalty.141  For example, in the 
case of Soering v. United Kingdom,142 the European Court of Human 
Rights concluded that extradition of the defendant to the United States 
would violate the European Convention on Human Rights, because Soer-
ing would be in danger of being tortured.143  Foreign states refuse to extra-
dite defendants to the United States as a retorsion for the U.S. choice to 
ignore international law. 
B. Natural Law: The Death Penalty Is Irrational and Thus Per Se Uncon-
stitutional 
The death penalty violates principles of natural justice as it is an irra-
tional means to the end of deterring crime.  Capital punishment does not 
deter because most criminals are irrational.  Capital punishment itself is 
irrational because it falls disproportionally on the poor and socially disad-
vantaged, especially on the class of persons descended from slaves.  Capi-
tal punishment is also disproportional and irrational because it sometimes 
falls on the innocent and is irrevocable.  As such it is a violation of princi-
ples of natural justice and natural reasoning.  Because the death penalty is 
irrational, it is also unconstitutional.  It is not a sane means to any permis-
sible state end. 
1. The Death Penalty May Be Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Before he was advocating torture,144 Alan Dershowitz opposed capital 
punishment, arguing that it was cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.145  An additional argument was that the death penalty was 
  
 141. See Elizabeth Burleson, Juvenile Execution, Terrorist Extradition, and Supreme Court Discre-
tion to Consider International Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 68 ALB. L. REV. 909, 910 (2005). 
 142. Soering v. United Kingdom, 1989 E.C.H.R. (ser. A) No. 161, at 14, available at http://www. 
worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1989/14.html. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor Strauss, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 275, 277 (2003).  “I am generally against torture as a normative matter, and I would like to see its 
use minimized.”  Id. (emphasis added).  “Minimized” is no synonym for “abolished.”  Though Der-
showitz may not know it, torture is illegal under international law and is a violation of jus cogens.  See 
generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SUMMARY OF INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. LAW PROHIBITING 
TORTURE AND OTHER ILL-TREATMENT OF PERSONS IN CUSTODY (2004), http://www.hrw.org/english/ 
docs/2004/05/24/usint8614.htm.  See also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (discussing 
civil causes of action in the United States based on international law).  So Dershowitz’s proposal for 
torture warrants is not just a fascist affront to human rights, it is also quite illegal. 
 145. See Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 
83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1775 (1970). 
File: Engle - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 3 Created on: 3/5/2008 9:53:00 PM Last Printed: 3/5/2008 9:53:00 PM 
2008 DEATH IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 505 
 
administered arbitrarily and capriciously.146  Of course, the administration 
of the death penalty can be cruel and unusual.147  However, history has 
shown this was the wrong way to argue since it implied there could be a 
just administration of an inherently unjust punishment.  Thus, soon after 
Furman, the Court in Gregg v. Georgia148 allowed capital punishment—
provided adequate “safeguards” were in place.149  The problem with killing 
prisoners is not that killing is cruel or unusual.  Capital punishment is un-
constitutional because killing prisoners is inherently unfair and notoriously 
and inevitably inefficient.  No “safeguards” could change that.  In fact, 
“safeguards” guarantee the administration will be expensive and ineffi-
cient. 
2. The Death Penalty Is Disproportional 
The death penalty has been held to be unconstitutionally dispropor-
tionate when imposed as a punishment for rape.150  I argue that the penalty 
is disproportional in all cases because it falls on the poor and especially on 
the descendants of liberated slaves.  It is disproportionate as to the individ-
ual prisoner who may well be innocent and lynched—punished where there 
was no crime in fact, or punished more severely than a white person would 
have been punished.  It is also disproportionate because any analysis quick-
ly concludes that descendants of slaves are the people most likely to go to 
prison and be executed.  Capital punishment violates principles of individ-
ual justice (corrective transactional justice) and of social justice. 
The death penalty has also been found disproportional in the case of 
felony murder.151  The argument that the death penalty is unconstitutional 
because it is inherently disproportional becomes compelling when we see 
that the penalty sometimes falls on the wrong individual and falls dispro-
portionately on black persons as a class and is, in every instance where 
applied, irrevocable. 
  
 146. This argument was adopted suddenly, in 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 
(1972) (per curiam). 
 147. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (“Punishments are cruel when they involve torture 
or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in 
the constitution.”). 
 148. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 149. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, and Burke, 
57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 664–65 (2006). 
 150. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598–600 (1977) (declaring the death penalty an unconstitu-
tionally disproportionate sentence for the crime of rape of an adult woman). 
 151. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (finding death penalty unconstitutional where 
defendant merely participated in the felony to which the murder charge was imputed). 
File: Engle - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 3 Created on:  3/5/2008 9:53:00 PM Last Printed: 3/5/2008 9:53:00 PM 
506 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6, No. 3 
 
Any of these arguments alone might be sufficient.  Taken in concert 
they compel the conclusion that capital punishment is simply per se irra-
tional and thus unconstitutional. 
3. The Death Penalty Has No Deterrent Effect 
The death penalty is not an effective deterrent to crime,152 because 
most crimes are passionate acts or are committed by stupid people.153  
Most criminals are simply not rational economic actors.154  This, and the 
fact that it simply costs more to kill prisoners than to keep them in prison 
for life,155 explains why the death penalty is inefficient and uneconomical.  
A prisoner who labors contributes to society.  A dead prisoner does not.  
Since the death penalty does not and cannot deter,156 the cost-benefit analy-
sis is very obvious.  Appellate lawyers are very expensive.157  Dead prison-
ers are entirely unproductive.  Prisoners are compelled to do forced labor 
and more than earn their keep.158  Expropriating prison labor is profit-
able,159 and partly explains why the United States is the world’s leading 
  
 152. See Rudolph J. Gerber, Death Is Not Worth It, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 335, 350 (1996) (“[N]o proof 
exists that general deterrence results from capital punishment as opposed to life imprisonment.”); 
Michael L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The Views of the Experts, 
87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 10 (1996) (“[T]he death penalty does, and can do, little to reduce 
rates of criminal violence.”).  But see Adam Liptak, Does Death Penalty Save Lives? A New Debate, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, § 1, at 1 (citing recent studies that have found a minor deterrent effect 
associated with the death penalty). 
 153. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 301–05 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 154. See generally ACLU, THE CASE AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY (1997), http://www.aclu.org/ 
capital/general/10441pub19971231.html. 
 155. Id.  For example, the federal prison labor program, UNICOR, paid wages ranging from $0.23 
per hour to $1.15 per hour in 2001.  PETER WAGNER, THE PRISON INDEX: TAKING THE PULSE OF THE 
CRIME CONTROL INDUSTRY § 3 (2003), available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/prisonindex/ 
prisonlabor.html. 
 156. See generally ACLU, supra note 154. 
 157. For example, in Washington State, the trial of a murder case pursuing the death penalty is ap-
proximately $470,000 more expensive than trying the same case as a non-capital case.  Direct appeals 
cost approximately $100,000 more in death penalty cases than in non-death penalty murder cases.  
WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE DEATH PENALTY SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC DEFENSE 18–20 (2006), available at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ 
finalreportbog.pdf. 
 158. See generally Jeffrey R. Kling & Alan B. Krueger, Costs, Benefits and Distributional Conse-
quences of Inmate Labor (Princeton Univ. Indus. Rel. Section, Working Paper No. 449, 2001), avail-
able at http://www.irs.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/449.pdf. 
 159. South Carolina Department of Corrections presents a representative example of three operating 
programs: 
Inmates working in this [traditional] program may receive a wage of up to $.35 per 
hour. . . . [I]nmate wages can be negotiated with private sector companies since it does not 
fall under Federal Minimum Wage requirements.   
Inmates [in the Service Program] earn from $.35 to $1.80 per hour. . . .  
[Inmates in the Prison Industry Enterprise Program] . . . acknowledge that taxes, victim 
compensation and room and board will be deducted from their gross pay.  Pay ranges from 
$5.15 to $10.00 per hour. 
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prison state with the most prisoners per capita and in absolute terms on 
earth.160 
4. The Death Penalty Often Punishes the Innocent 
Not only is killing prisoners ineffective, but the state often kills the 
wrong person.  “Since 1973, 115 innocent people have been sentenced to 
death in the U.S.”161  DNA testing has demonstrated that “innocent people 
are convicted of capital crimes with some frequency.”162  This punishment 
is irrevocable: the state cannot resurrect the dead.  This too explains why 
the death penalty is inherently irrational and thus violates natural law and 
the right to life. 
5. The Death Penalty Is Racially Discriminatory 
Not only does the state kill the wrong people, it kills black people and 
people who kill white people much more often than other groups.163  This 
discriminatory application was rightly seen as unconstitutional at one 
time.164  However, because the argument was that the death penalty was 
either cruel, undignified, or badly administered, rather than per se irra-
  
Currently 2,233 inmates are working in Prison Industries.  The Prison Industries Pro-
gram is completely self-supporting, providing valuable training for the inmates while gener-
ating funding for the Agency. 
S.C. Dep’t of Corr., Traditional, Prison Industries (2007), http://www.doc.sc.gov/programs/pi.jsp 
(emphasis added).  Of course, prison labor is not subject to OSHA, nor are the laborers able to quit, 
strike, or even complain.  And it just so happens that the majority of prison laborers are black and 
hispanic.  One can fairly call it a modern form of the slave plantation, but it is more economically 
productive than the death penalty and the lesser of two bads. 
 160. See ROY WALMSLEY, KING’S COLLEGE, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST (6th ed. 2005), 
available at http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/rel/icps/world-prison-population-list-2005.pdf; see also Gail 
Russell Chaddock, U.S. Notches World’s Highest Incarceration Rate, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., Aug. 18, 
2003, at 2 (“More than 5.6 million Americans are in prison or have served time there, according to a 
new report by the Justice Department released Sunday.  That’s 1 in 37 adults living in the United 
States, the highest incarceration level in the world. . . . If current trends continue, it means that a black 
male in the United States would have about a 1 in 3 chance of going to prison during his lifetime.  For a 
Hispanic male, it’s 1 in 6; for a white male, 1 in 17.”).  The land of the free and home of the brave has 
been turned into the land of the fear and the home of the slaves.  Patriots, those who love liberty, ought 
to organize against that. 
 161. Law Enforcement Officials Call on New York State Legislature to Keep New York’s Unjust 
Death Penalty Law off the Books, NEW YORKERS AGAINST DEATH PENALTY, Aug. 1, 2004, http:// 
www.nyadp.org/main/police811.html?news=50. 
 162. United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 163. See infra Statistical Annex Table I. 
 164. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that a law 
that yields discriminatory results “has no more sanctity” under the Eighth Amendment than a law 
effecting those same results through express terms). 
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tional, death crept back into the judges’ interpretations.165  The death pen-
alty is unconstitutional not because it is cruel and unusual, but because it is 
inherently unfair and cannot be administered justly under any circum-
stances. 
The objective of a discriminatory intent is to achieve a discriminatory 
effect.  So it is logical to presume that a discriminatory effect is the result 
of a discriminatory intent—effects do not occur randomly but are the result 
of willful action.  Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court rejects the propo-
sition that a racially discriminatory purpose ought to be inferred from a 
racially discriminatory effect.  For the Court, the presumption of constitu-
tionality outweighs the presumption of practical reason.  Thus, the defen-
dant alleging a violation of her right to equal protection of the law bears 
the burden of proving “the existence of purposeful discrimination.”166  The 
Court rejects inferring racially discriminatory purpose from racially dis-
criminatory effect because it believes that other crimes would then also be 
attacked as racially discriminatory and because gender would also provide 
a claim (many more men go to prison than women).167  However, the fact 
that we can easily observe racially discriminatory outcomes in all manner 
of criminal law just shows that racism can be book-smart, hiding under a 
black robe instead of a white sheet.  A Court truly interested in ending ra-
cial discrimination would hold that a racially discriminatory effect in crim-
inal law raises a rebuttable presumption of discriminatory intent.  The bur-
den of proof should fall on the state to show that no discriminatory intent 
existed despite the effect, because criminal statutes are to be strictly con-
strued and because of the presumption of liberty (in dubitas, libertas). 
Widespread discrimination in penal law is a fact168 and that fact is fur-
ther evidence that the death penalty cannot be constitutionally adminis-
tered.  Capital punishment is not only an irrational means to a desirable 
end; it is also a reflection of continued oppression of black people by white 
people in the United States.  It must stop. 
  
 165. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177–78 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“For nearly two 
centuries, this Court, repeatedly and often expressly, has recognized that capital punishment is not 
invalid Per se.”). 
 166. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 
385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967)). 
 167. See id. at 315–18. 
 168. See Andrea Shapiro, Unequal Before the Law: Men, Women and the Death Penalty, 8 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 427, 428 (2000) (“[W]hen the victims of homicide were White, it was statis-
tically likely that the defendant would be convicted and sentenced to death.”) (citing David C. Baldus 
et al., Law and Statistics in Conflict: Reflections on McCleskey v. Kemp, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 147, 148 tbl.13.2 (1994)). 
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C. “Safeguards” and “Exceptions” 
Because courts fail to recognize the inherent irrationality of the death 
penalty and its class character, yet can see its unfair and disproportional 
effects anytime they look at the system, they have tried to implement 
“safeguards” and “exceptions” to remedy an inherently unfair system.  
That is an example of the global trend toward recognizing that the death 
penalty violates principles of natural justice as an irrational means to the 
end of deterring crime and as a punishment which disproportionally falls 
on the innocent and socially disadvantaged.  However, the “safeguards” do 
not work and cannot work and by definition make the system expensive 
and inefficient.  Thus, capital punishment is unconstitutional because it 
violates basic principles of natural justice.  It will eventually be recognized 
as such in the United States—as it already has throughout the rest of the 
developed world, including the rest of the developed common law world. 
1. “Safeguards” and Mandatory Sentencing 
In Franz v. Lockhart, a federal district judge found the Arkansas death 
penalty statute unconstitutional because there was no mandatory appellate 
review of the death sentence.169  This finding mirrored the Supreme 
Court’s finding, in 1976, that mandatory death penalty statutes are uncon-
stitutional.170  Accordingly, in 1977, the death penalty for rape was held to 
be unconstitutional because the punishment is disproportional to the 
crime.171  The disproportionality and irrationality of the death penalty has 
been increasingly recognized by the Supreme Court. 
2. Exceptions: The Retarded and Juveniles 
Because capital punishment is inherently unfair, a number of excep-
tions to capital punishment are entering into U.S. domestic law.  The exe-
cution of the mentally retarded has been found unconstitutional,172 in part 
because the Supreme Court recognized the development of a national con-
sensus around the idea that the execution of mentally retarded persons is 
inherently unfair and thus unconstitutional.173  Likewise, in Roper v. Sim-
mons, the Court found the execution of offenders under the age of eighteen 
  
 169. 700 F. Supp. 1005, 1025 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (rejecting plaintiffs’ standing but nonetheless recog-
nizing the constitutional requirement of mandatory review for death sentences). 
 170. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301–04 (1976). 
 171. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (finding death penalty unconstitutionally disproportion-
ate sentence for crime of rape of an adult woman). 
 172. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
 173. See id. 
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unconstitutional.174  This determination, a reaffirmation of earlier U.S. ca-
selaw,175 was the result of the development of a national consensus that 
killing those who were children at the time of their crimes is inherently 
unfair, as well as international concerns.176  The Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, for example, prohibits executions of those persons aged under 
eighteen at the time of the crime,177 and a 1994 act of Congress forbade 
juvenile executions.178  In sum, “[t]he death penalty cases . . . stand as 
strong support for the notion that the Court is willing to overrule itself on 
life and death issues other than abortion.”179  The question is: will the ex-
ceptions eat up the rule?  The answer is yes, and the quicker the better. 
3. Exception via Trial by Jury: Jury Nullification 
Trial by jury is considered the most important constitutional right of 
all180 under both the English181 and American182 constitutions.  Trial by 
jury, according to Blackstone, is “the glory of the English law,” and it has 
been characterized, like the U.S. Constitution, as rooted in Magna Carta.183  
The reason jury trials are so crucial to liberty in the common law is that the 
  
 174. 543 U.S. 551, 574–75 (2005). 
 175. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822–23 (1988) (holding death penalty per se unconstitu-
tional where criminal is under sixteen years of age when crime committed). 
 176. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564, 577–78. 
 177. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (“Nei-
ther capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for of-
fences committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”). 
 178. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567. 
 179. Calabresi, supra note 149, at 668. 
 180. See generally Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
William Blackstone, the Framers’ accepted authority on English law and the English Consti-
tution, described the right to trial by jury in criminal prosecutions as “the grand bulwark of 
[the Englishman’s] liberties . . . secured to him by the great charter.”  One of the indictments 
of the Declaration of Independence against King George III was that he had “subject[ed] us 
to a Jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our Laws” in approv-
ing legislation “[f]or depriving us, in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury.” . . . The 
right to trial by jury in criminal cases was the only guarantee common to the 12 state consti-
tutions that predated the Constitutional Convention, and it has appeared in the constitution 
of every State to enter the Union thereafter. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 181. Trial by jury was the first and most essential feature of the English constitution: 
From these passages in Judge Blackstone’s Commentaries, from the variety of authori-
ties to which he refers, and from many others of the greatest reputation, it most clearly ap-
pears, that the trial by jury was ever esteemed a first, a fundamental, and a most essential 
principle, in the English constitution.  From England this sacred right was transferred to this 
country, and hath continued, through all the changes in our government, the firm basis of 
our liberty, the fairest inheritance transmitted by our ancestors! 
JAMES M. VARNUM, THE CASE, TREVETT AGAINST WEEDEN 13–14 (Providence, John Carter 1787). 
 182. The right of trial by jury descended from England to the United States.  Id. at 17–18. 
 183. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 84–85 (1942). 
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common law grants juries the right to nullify the law when they believe the 
law itself is unjust—when the statute violates natural law, a jury may ig-
nore the statute.184  The jury must consist of twelve persons185 for the obvi-
ous reason that the truth is only attained by a comparison of different 
views. 
The jury must be “truly representative of the community.”186  A jury of 
one’s peers means those similarly situated.  Thus, poor people should have 
jurors of similar economic means and black defendants should have black 
juries187 because justice should not only be done, but should be manifestly 
seen to be done.  If you are white, how would you feel if you were judged 
by an all-black jury accusing you of killing a black man?  It would be im-
possible to claim the system to be racist, even with all its ugly history, if 
black defendants were judged by black juries. 
III.  CONCLUSION: THE DEATH PENALTY IS IRRATIONAL, VIOLATES 
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW, AND IS THUS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The trend in both international and national law is clear: the death pen-
alty is increasingly recognized as irrational and thus illegal.  More than one 
Supreme Court Justice has held that capital punishment is per se unconsti-
tutional.188  Constitutional standards evolve with social progress.189  The 
death penalty has become unconstitutional, as it violates principles of natu-
  
 184. See generally Steve J. Shone, Lysander Spooner, Jury Nullification, and Magna Carta, 22 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 651 (2004).  See also Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 3–4 (1794) (recog-
nizing the jury’s right “to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy”). 
 185. See generally 1 COKE, supra note 18, at 155a (“[U]sage and ancient course maketh law.  And it 
seemeth to me, that the law in this case delighteth herselfe in the number of 12; for there must not onely 
be 12 jurors for the tryall of matters of fact, but 12 judges of ancient time for tryall of matters of law in 
the Exchequer Chamber.”). 
 186. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (“It is part of the established tradition in the use of 
juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community.”). 
 187. William Sharpe McKechnie, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF 
KING JOHN, WITH AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 377–78 (1914) (citations omitted). 
The need for “a judgment of peers” was recognized at an early date in England. . . . [T]he 
“peers” of a Crown tenant were his fellow Crown tenants, who would normally deliver 
judgment in the Curia Regis; while the “peers” of the tenant of a mesne lord were the other 
suitors of the Court Baron of the manor. 
Id.  Also, Jews might be judged by those of their own religion, and a foreign merchant by a jury com-
posed partly of those of his country.  Id. at 378; see also F.M. Powicke, Per Iudicium Parium Vel Per 
Legem Terrae, in MAGNA CARTA COMMEMORATION ESSAYS 96, 101–02 (Henry Elliott Malden ed., 
1917). 
 188. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240, 305, 358–59 (1972) (Justices Brennan and Marshall 
finding the death penalty unconstitutional per se). 
 189. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must 
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety.”). 
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ral rights and natural reasoning.  The death penalty is unconstitutional, not 
because (or not merely because) it is an example of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, or an affront to human dignity,190 or even because it is unfairly 
administered.  The death penalty is unconstitutional because it is irrational.  
It is irrational because it is inherently unfair, falling disproportionally on 
the former slave class and all too often on the wrong person, with irrevoca-
ble injustice as a consequence.  The death penalty is not unconstitutional 
because it is unfairly administered.  It is unconstitutional because it cannot 
be fairly administered.  It is inherently unfair and irrational and per se un-
constitutional.  An irrational law is not merely a bad law.  It is no law at 
all.191  That is the true spirit of Anglo-American constitutionalism. 
 
  
 190. William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the 
Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313, 330 (1986) (arguing that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional as 
an affront to human dignity). 
 191. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1048 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
trans., 2d rev. ed. 1920) (“[A] law that is not just, seems to be no law at all.”  (citing AUGUSTINE, DE 
LIBERO ARBITRIO, I, 5)). 
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STATISTICAL ANNEX 
Figure 1: Racial Disparity in Prisons 
Racial Disparity Between U.S. and Incarcerated Populations* 
 




Table 1: Race of Executed Prisoners 
Race of Defendants Executed in the United States Since 1976* 
BLACK 374 34% 
HISPANIC 76 7% 
WHITE 625 57% 
OTHER 24 2% 
* Race of Death Row Inmates Executed Since 1976, Death Penalty Information Center, available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=184&scid=. 
 
File: Engle - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 3 Created on:  3/5/2008 9:53:00 PM Last Printed: 3/5/2008 9:53:00 PM 
514 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6, No. 3 
 
Table 2: No Deterrent Effect 
Ratio of Executions to the National Murder Rate: 1976–1995* 
Year Number of Executions National Murder Rate  
1976 0 8.8 
1977 1 8.8 
1978 0 9 
1979 2 9.7 
1980 0 10.2 
1981 1 9.8 
1982 2 9.1 
1983 5 8.3 
1984 21 7.9 
1985 18 7.9 
1986 18 8.6 
1987 25 8.3 
1988 11 8.3 
1989 16 8.7 
1990 23 9.4 
1991 14 9.8 
1992 31 9.3 
1993 38 9.5 
1994 31 9 
1995 56 8 
* American Civil Liberties Union, The Case Against the Death Penalty (Dec. 31, 1997), available 
at http://www.aclu.org/capital/general/10441pub 19971231.html. 
 
